This Washington convulsion may serve the political
interests of President Obama’s domestic opponents, but it obscures two far more
important issues: the deterioration of the overall situation in Libya, and the
longer-term challenge the United States faces of managing security risks when
conducting diplomacy in insecure locations. The mindless political debate over
Obama administration talking points from last fall harms efforts to come to
grips with both of these issues and shows how superficial our debates on
national security have become.
Militias and the deteriorating security situation
The security situation in Libya is getting worse,
not better. In the last month alone, car bombs have hit the French embassy in
Tripoli and a hospital in Benghazi. Earlier this year unknown assailants
attacked five British activists near the Egyptian border, and U.S. and European
governments have warned of “imminent” threats in Libya.
Due to the deteriorating situation, a few days ago
the U.S. military put its forces in Europe on a heightened state of alert. Also
in the past week, the United States and Britain withdrew some of their
diplomatic staff from Libya due to the increased threats there. Clearly, the
security situation inside Libya—and what the United States and other countries
can do to help Libya stop the downward spiral—should be the focus of the
debate.
This deterioration is due in large part to the
continued power that militias wield in Libya. By laying siege to the foreign
and justice ministries in Tripoli and attacking those who protested their
actions, the militias forced the government to pass a draconian “political
isolation law.” What’s more, militias continue to run their own prisons—and
continue to detain Saif al-Islam Qaddafi, the highest-ranking survivor of the
Qaddafi regime, who is wanted for crimes against humanity. The Libyan
government’s capitulation to brazen coercion by militias and their political
allies severely undermines its halting efforts to build national-level security
services and establish the rule of law in Libya.
In short, these groups continue to sow instability
throughout the country by preventing the government from establishing credible
security institutions and the rule of law. Worse, they have openly used the
threat of violence to force a democratically elected government to bend to
their wishes, and they have employed violence against those with whom they
disagreed. This lack of stability and security also gives violent Islamist
extremist groups such as Ansar al-Sharia, which attacked the Benghazi facility
last September, freedom of movement and action. It also facilitates the spread
of weapons and militants from and through Libya, as was apparently the case in
the January 2013 Algerian gas-facility attack.
The United States, its partners, and international
institutions could help rectify this situation by providing training,
equipment, and other forms of security assistance to the Libyan government.
This support could help the government consolidate its security sector and
establish public order and the rule of law. However, the zero-risk mentality
produced by the scandal mongering currently dominating the debate is likely to
prevent any new security-sector reform initiatives in Washington. The United
States and its partners are now stuck in a vicious circle: They cannot offer
requisite levels of assistance to the Libyan government because they are
unwilling to risk the poor security situation, and the poor security situation
is not likely to improve without the requisite level of international help.
Managing diplomatic risk in insecure locations
More broadly, the furor over the Benghazi attack
talking points could do severe damage to U.S. national security and diplomatic
efforts. For several decades the United States has been hampering its
diplomats’ ability to shape and influence the situations in countries that are
vital to U.S. interests by imposing increasingly rigid security restrictions.
Numerous independent assessments have noted the negative impact these measures
have had on the State Department’s ability to advance its mission.
In 2009 the Government Accountability Office warned
that security procedures:
… for
State’s diplomatic corps [have], at times, been in tension with State’s
diplomatic mission. For example, Diplomatic Security has established strict
policies concerning access to U.S. facilities that usually include personal and
vehicle screening. Some public affairs officials—whose job it is to foster
relations with host country nationals—have expressed concerns that the security
measures discourage visitors from attending U.S. embassy events or exhibits. In
addition, the new embassies and consulates, with their high walls, deep
setback, and strict screening procedures, have evoked the nickname, “Fortress
America.”
The effort to turn the Benghazi attack into a
political albatross for current and former Obama administration officials has
done and will do significant damage to American diplomatic efforts in hostile
environments. Policymakers may become even more reluctant to take risks with
diplomatic personnel in these situations for fear of a political boomerang if
something goes wrong.
As a result, the default policy may be to retrench
behind the walls of so-called fortress embassies, take few if any risks with
nonmilitary personnel, and surrender potential American influence on the ground
in dangerous parts of the world. By flogging the phantom scandal of Benghazi,
Obama administration critics who demand more direct intervention in Syria
ironically are undermining their own argument. And if something goes wrong and
Americans die, the administration will likely be rewarded with scandalmongering
by advocates of the very policy that put American personnel at risk in the
first place. The State Department’s Accountability Review Board, convened in
the event of loss of life or destruction of property at U.S. diplomatic
facilities abroad, recommended the administration “work more rigorously and
adeptly to address” the security challenges inherent in diplomacy and to
discuss its recommendations. Instead, congressional investigators have chosen
to impugn the integrity of the board’s leaders, with Rep. Darrell Issa (R-CA)
accusing respected former diplomat Thomas Pickering of having “heard what the
administration wanted to hear” in his investigation. In addition, they focused
their attention on post-attack debates and unrealistic rescue scenarios. None
of these approaches help stimulate a debate on the proper level of risk that
diplomats should assume, sending instead the implicit message that the answer
should be none at all.
The hue and cry over Benghazi simply detracts from
the two fundamental issues going forward: the level of acceptable risk for
American diplomats in dangerous environments and the ongoing deterioration of
security in Libya. It will be impossible for the Obama administration—or any
administration that comes after it—to make rational decisions on the latter
without a shared consensus on the former. The politicization of Benghazi
accomplishes nothing except to make the default acceptable level of risk for
American personnel abroad zero. However defensible such a posture may be in
political terms, it does not allow the United States to exercise sufficient
influence abroad to deal with emerging security threats and address pressing
foreign policy problems.
About the authors: Brian Katulis is a Senior Fellow
at the Center for American Progress. Peter Juul is a Policy Analyst at the
Center.
This article was published by the Center for
American Progress.
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