Lending superficial credence to this idea is the
fact the world has not yet been incinerated in a nuclear conflagration. This
fact has been cited as vindication of the U.S. government's decision to amass a
huge stockpile of nuclear weapons during the Cold War, and it is still used
today to justify retention of that arsenal.
Mutually assured destruction, or MAD, is a military
doctrine based on the strategy of deterrence. This doctrine states that a
full-scale use of nuclear weapons by two opposing sides would effectively
result in the complete destruction of both the attacker and the defender. The
theory here is that neither side, once armed, has any incentive either to
initiate a conflict or disarm.
This doctrine assumes that each side has enough
nuclear weapons to destroy the other side — and that either side, if attacked
for any reason by the other, would retaliate without hesitation and with equal
or greater force. Should one side launch a first strike, a rapid escalation of
hostilities would commence, resulting in the “mutually assured destruction” of
both combatants. The stated objective of MAD theorists is a “nuclear standoff”
that maintains a tense but stable global peace.
MAD was first developed in the 1960s as the Soviet
Union developed delivery systems capable of striking the continental United
States. Proponents of MAD claimed it helped prevent a direct confrontation
between the United States and the Soviet Union — thus limiting the conflict to
proxy wars in the Third World.
MAD required both sides to have a “credible
deterrent,” which directed U.S. and Soviet war planners to invest heavily in
their respective nuclear arsenals. It also required that neither side could
develop adequate defenses from a nuclear attack lest the delicate balance of terror
that lay at the core of the MAD doctrine be upset. This was recognized formally
by the United States and the Soviet Union in the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty
of 1972.
Now, all of this was theory, of course. And as long
as the ICBMs (Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles) remain in their silos, it
may appear to have some validity. But we now know that there have been many
false alarms that have brought the world to the brink of a nuclear holocaust.
Such incidents undermine the “rationality” of MAD and remind us that no matter
how many precautions are taken to avoid mishaps, errors can still occur.
One such incident occurred on September 26, 1983,
when Lt. Col. Stanislav Petrov, a Soviet ballistics officer commanding a bunker
outside Moscow, violated standard operating procedure by ignoring what his
early warning satellite system was telling him: that the United States had
launched five ICBMs at his country.
Had Petrov followed orders and alerted his superiors
of an impending attack, given the heightened tensions between the superpowers
at the time — and the fact that those with authority to order a retaliatory
strike would have had only minutes to decide — it is possible the crisis would
have escalated into a full-scale nuclear exchange.
Luckily for humanity, Petrov kept his cool and
reasoned that the United States was not likely to launch such a limited attack
(five missiles). He decided to report the incident as a false alarm. As it
turned out, the “attack” was an anomaly created by the sun’s reflection off
cloud tops, which the early warning satellite system reported erroneously as a
fusillade of incoming missiles.
Another incident occurred on January 25, 1995, when
Russia’s early warning radar detected a missile launch from Norway. The early
warning and the control and command center switched to combat mode. Officials
brought President Boris Yeltsin the briefcase to authorize nuclear launch.
But in a few minutes, the Russian radar determined
that the missile’s impact would be outside their borders.
In fact, the Norwegian missile had been launched for
the purposes of scientific research. While Norway had notified 35 countries,
including Russia, that the launch was planned, the information failed to reach
the on-duty personnel of Russia’s early warning system.
The United States has also had its share of
false-alarm incidents.
On the morning of November 9, 1979, duty officers at
four NORAD command centers saw patterns on their display screens showing a
full-scale Soviet missile attack underway. During the next few minutes,
preparations for a retaliatory strike were implemented. Bombers were scrambled,
and the president’s National Emergency Airborne Command Post was ordered into
the air, though without the president on board.
The crisis soon passed when NORAD was able to
ascertain that there were no incoming missiles and that the false alarm had
been caused by someone inadvertently leaving an exercise tape running in the
command center’s computer.
Another false alarm occurred in the early morning
hours of June 3, 1980, when displays in the NORAD command center started
showing large numbers of incoming missiles. Preparations for retaliation were
instituted, but were canceled because duty officers determined that the numbers
being reported were too anomalous to be an actual missile attack. A similar
incident occurred only three days later, and retaliatory measures were once
again implemented before being canceled.
An investigation determined that the false alarms
were caused by a faulty computer chip producing random data, resulting in
deceptive displays at several NORAD command posts.
Now, some would argue that ultimately the
“fail-safe” systems worked. After all, no missiles were launched, and the world
was not incinerated. But a nuclear holocaust was only averted because the
individuals who happened to be on duty did not panic and took the initiative to
do nothing despite what their instruments were telling them.
Sure, the probability of a nuclear war resulting
from one of the several incidents listed above may have been small. However,
small probabilities add up. It only has to go wrong once.
The point here is that while proponents of MAD cite
the avoidance of a nuclear war as evidence of the doctrine’s validity, the
possibility of an inadvertent nuclear war due to an unforeseen sequence of
events remains a threat to all of humanity.
Apparently, only once the missiles leave their silos
and zero hour arrives will MAD have been proven to be a false doctrine. That is
a tough way to prove an idea wrong.
Indeed, the avoidance of a nuclear war these many
decades may be attributed more to luck than to the rationality of MAD.
This counsels humility rather than prideful
vindication and suggests that, rather than continuing with MAD, the United
States and the other nuclear powers should chart a different course; one that
leads to the total abolition of nuclear weapons.
About the author: Tim Kelly is a columnist and
policy advisor at the Future of Freedom Foundation in Fairfax, Virginia, a
correspondent for Radio Americas Special Investigator, and a political
cartoonist.
This article was published by the Future of Freedom
Foundation.
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